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BRAZIL IN THE GLOBAL WORLD:
Five Centuries of Lost Memories
Maria Lucia Caira Gitahy
and
Francisco Foot Hardman
I. Brazil: Land of Contrasts
To anyone crossing the 8.5 million square kilometers of Brazil,
the image used thirty years ago by Roger Bastide,1 “land of con-
trasts,” would still be apropos. There are contrasts of every sort:
geographical, historic, cultural, economic, social and regional.
The idea of the existence of “several Brazils” — or at least the
dualism of an “archaic” nation and a “modern” other—is an old
one in the tradition of Brazilian studies. The sources of this idea
can be traced back to nineteenth-century Romanticism. A little
earlier than Bastide’s consecration of the image of “contrasts,”
another French Brazilianist, Jacques Lambert, formulated the
famous thesis of “two Brazils.” One of them was predominantly
urban, coastal, White, Europeanized, and relatively developed;
the other was rural, technically and economically backward,
non-White, and attached to non-European cultural traditions.
Brazil reproduces in itself the world contrasts: we find in it
aspects which recall those of New York or Chicago, besides oth-
ers which evoke those of India or of Egypt.2
This overlapping of epochs, this hybridism of diverse cultures
has perplexed travelers, artists, writers, and scientists for hun-
dreds of years. From the Bavarian naturalists Spix and Martius
in their famous Journey across Brazil, 1817 – 1820, to the anthro-
pologist Lévi-Strauss in his classic essay Tristes Tropiques (1955),
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these enormous historic-cultural polarities have been repeatedly
chronicled. Roger Bastide concluded his introduction to Tristes
Tropiques by stressing the inability of traditional social science
concepts to deal with these contrasts. For him, such a situation
involved constant metamorphosis, fusion, and ebullience. He
even went so far as to say, “The sociologist who wants to under-
stand Brazil not rarely needs to become a poet.”3
In order to gain a comprehensive, accurate, and up-to-date
understanding of Brazil today, the travelers need to become
poets. For it is only with a poet’s eyes that we are able to recon-
cile such drastically different situations and experiences, from
the lyric to the epic, from the tragicomic to the dramatic. The
sublime emotions we feel before the Amazonian forest, whose
compact vegetal mass covers nearly 60 percent of the nation, are
at odds with our horror at the unequal history of land occupa-
tion. The open skies of the cerrados (savannas) in the Central-
West and Northwest contrasts with the conflictive saga of the
agricultural frontier expansion and mining activities. The
beauty of Pantanal or of the 9,000-kilometer-long Atlantic shore,
which alternates between beaches and wind-swept cliffs
(falésias), contrasts with the realized dreams of artificial cities
built in the midst of the sertão.4
The generosity of the ecological and topographic environ-
ment contrasts with the violent integration of the survivors of
native cultures to the civilizing process. When the colonizers
arrived in the sixteenth century, the native inhabitants totaled
between 5 and 10 million. Today only about 300,000 remain,
most living in miserable conditions.5 In vital and modern
metropoles such as São Paulo,6 Rio de Janeiro, Brasília, and oth-
ers, we find acute hunger, unemployment, homelessness, aban-
doned children and adolescents, crime, and extreme violence
(including that committed by police officers). And this urban
violence is rivaled in atrocity only by the daily violence in the
countryside. The Sem Terra Movement (MST),7 under these con-
ditions, has turned out to become the main organizer of rural
dissatisfaction with the society and the policies of the central
government.
At present, a preliminary count of the Brazilian population
found a total of 156,804,333 inhabitants.8 Nearly 75 percent of
this total lives in cities, and only one-fourth in the countryside.
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The relationship between the rural and urban populations
began to change in the thirties, but the first significant reversal
occurred in the sixties and seventies, when the urban population
became the majority. According to 1993 data, Brazil is still a
country of great internal migrations: 40 percent of people do not
live in the cities in which they were born, and 16 percent live in
states other than their native ones.9 We have to remember that
nearly 46 percent of the almost 5,000 Brazilian municípios (coun-
ties) are small (less than 10,000 inhabitants) and that the rate of
demographic growth in the large urban centers is currently
falling. This fact suggests that future public policies for health,
education, and employment will need to be decentralized.
In this picture, great differences persist among classes and
regions. Brazil continues to be the “champion” of income con-
centration among the developing nations. The wealthiest 10 per-
cent earn almost 50 percent of the national income, while the
poorest 10 percent earn only 0.8 percent. This inequality has
grown over time: in the sixties, the income of the richest 10 per-
cent was thirty-four times that of the poorest 10 percent; in the
nineties, it is seventy-eight times greater! Income per capita fell
from nearly U.S.$3,000 in the eighties to U.S.$2,900 in the
nineties. Infant mortality, on the other hand, fell significantly,
from 65.8 per thousand in 1980 to 51.6 per thousand in 1990.
However, when looked at region by region, a great disparity
emerges: the rate is only 30 per thousand in the Southeast, com-
pared to 88.2 per thousand in the Northeast.10
Although literacy and school attendance are on the rise, chil-
dren are still being abandoned at alarming rates, especially in
the big cities. In 1990, almost 60 percent of children and
teenagers lived in families with a per capita monthly income of
U.S.$50 or less. The Brazilian labor market employs 7.5 million
people below the age of 18, representing almost 12 percent of the
economically active population. The majority of them earn less
than one minimal salary (around U.S.$110 per month), working
at hard labor such as harvesting sugarcane and extracting nat-
ural resources (e.g., mining, rubber tapping, sisal collecting,
etc.), work that adversely affects their school performance.
Brazil has a high dropout rate, especially in elementary schools.
In addition, we know that out of this statistically measurable
picture, a few million children and teenagers are urban margin-
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als — homeless and surviving by engaging in criminal activities
such as drug trafficking and prostitution.
However, only by mapping poverty, with its unequal con-
tours, can we come close to a picture of the Brazilian reality.
Brazil is one of the fastest growing countries of the twentieth
century; between 1945 and 1980 alone, its GNP multiplied 11
times and industrial production multiplied 16 times. Despite
this, the 1990 census registered nearly 58 million Brazilians —
almost one-third of the total population — living below the
poverty line (with a monthly per capita income of less than
U.S.$60), 16 million of whom live in absolute misery or indi-
gence (i.e., not even earning enough to buy basic food necessi-
ties). More than half of the impoverished live in the Northeast,
mostly in the rural areas.11 Further, a perverse effect of the accel-
erated urbanization of the last decades is that more than two-
thirds of the Brazilian poor are urban.12 The household survey
completes this dramatic picture: for every three urban house-
holds, at least one is below the poverty line; and in the rural
areas the proportion is nearly half.13
Further, although Brazil’s industrial, cultural, and technologi-
cal resources integrate the country with the globalized world, it
is also a society of social exclusion. The question remains: Are
there two Brazils, or just one? Is Brazil an integrated and consti-
tutive part of the modern Western order, or just an aberrant
periphery? The “poet traveler,” still perplexed, should perhaps
look back a little to the history of the modern world to uncover
aspects relevant to the understanding of the present situation.
II. The International Dimension in Brazilian History
Globalization is often presented as a uniquely contemporary
phenomenon and as the only possible future. Strictly speaking,
globalization is not new. The landscapes, cultures, and societies
on this side of the Atlantic were shaped in the context of an
important movement of globalization that began in the sixteenth
century. Brazil was born as a territory chosen by the Portuguese
as a place to establish a modern colonial enterprise—the cultiva-
tion of sugarcane for the international market. The sugarcane
plantations, and especially the engenhos (sugarcane mills), facto-
ries avant la lettre, were very advanced at the time they were
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built.14 Slavery was reintroduced to solve the “labor problem”
caused by the conquest and incorporation of a new continent
(exigencies of globalization aren’t so recent, after all). Conquest,
slave trade, and the extermination of native populations could
all be justified ideologically as a means to bring all the peoples
of the world to Christianity.15
Emphasizing this constitutive feature of our formation should
not, however, obscure the complexity of the historic change that
took place in each epoch and the enormous differences this sort
of generalization unavoidably misses. Obviously, globalization
in the sixteenth century was very different from the present
globalization. In the sixteenth century, globalization tended to
consolidate the power and prosperity of the recently unified or
unifying European nation-states. In colonial Brazil, the Metro-
politan Administration and the Catholic Church were the pillars
of the domination that the White elite exerted over the Afro-
Brazilian and native populations in order to assure the defini-
tion and relative control over the territory and the viability of
the colonial enterprise.
“With broadax and firebrand,” as described by Warren
Dean,16 the Portuguese appropriated and modified a whole terri-
tory. Previous environments and cultures were mercilessly
destroyed and condemned to oblivion. Over three centuries of
colonization, an entire civilization sprang up from the harsh
realities of cultural shock. More pervasive social and cultural
institutions, such as the patriarchal family, Catholicism, and the
Portuguese language, also provided an important basis for colo-
nial society. Slavery organized the whole fabric of social life, and
violence became a fact of life. The structure of the metropolitan-
colonial pact almost prevented the formation of an internal mar-
ket. However, administrative and port functions allowed for the
establishment of a supplies commerce and an urban environ-
ment.
The weight of the international dimension posed even the
very question of nationalism and of the construction of a nation
in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The presence of
separatist movements, popular rebellions, and regional protest
before and after the Declaration of Independence shows that
Brazil was not oblivious to the so-called Age of Revolution.
When Napoleon invaded Portugal in 1808, the British Navy
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moved the Portuguese Royal Family and the court to Brazil,
which elevated the colony to Reino Unido (United Kingdom of
Portugal and Brazil) and made it the head of the Portuguese
Empire.
In Brazil, the local elite, fearful of social upheaval and territor-
ial disintegration, conducted a hesitant independence process.
Haiti’s fate echoed as a threat to the White Brazilian elite, which
made up less than 30 percent of the population.17 They waited
until they convinced the crown heir himself, Dom Pedro, Regent
of Brazil, of the opportunity for political independence for the
kingdom. Supporting the Crown, the elite managed to keep
robust all the economic, social, and cultural institutions forged
in colonial times and to postpone deeper political and social
reform.
The constitution of a predominant nucleus of agricultural
exporters, mostly engaged in coffee,18 the main product of
Brazilian export, was the most important social and historical
fact of the first half of the nineteenth century. Consequently, the
southeastern region became the center of an independent
nation, with the affirmation of Rio de Janeiro as the new capital
of the country and as the commercial entrepôt, which Lisbon had
been in the past. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the
broader rearrangement of capitalism, normally referred to by
economic historians as the Second Industrial Revolution,
defined a “new international order” (Hobsbawm, among oth-
ers).19 Brazil had to face difficult challenges in order to win a role
as an acceptable partner in the “new” international system. In
many aspects, that historic moment recalls the challenges that
we are living in the present: dealing with another important
productive rearrangement at the international level.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the emergence of a mass
market and production for it brought new problems, even to an
exporter of crops such as Brazil. Among the problems to be
solved, two were imposing: to face the question of slavery20 by
creating a free labor market, and to promote the construction of
networks of urban transportation and utilities able to better con-
nect the increasing coffee production to the international market
while also redefining the country’s position in the world system.
Abolition of slavery (1888) and the establishment of the Repub-
lic (1889) provided the political landmarks necessary for this
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redefinition. The republican regime invested in the creation of a
free labor market and in a constructive effort designed to turn
the territory into one organized according to the modern eco-
nomic, social, and cultural standards of the time.
Requalifying the relationship between the city and country-
side and the productive spaces within both, as well as Brazil’s
role in the international division of labor, was not just a question
of physical infrastructure but also of the construction of institu-
tions capable of remaking social relations. A comprehensive
social diversification effort took place: it was necessary to create
superior cadres, intermediary “officers” and a large army of
labor able to build a Brazilian form of “modern” society. Many
of the scientific, professional, and cultural institutions founded
in that context provided the basis for much of the Brazilian intel-
lectual production up to the present.21
In the state of São Paulo, where the agricultural frontier
advanced fast with its coffee plantations, a politically articulated
elite cohered, lending a federalist character to the republican
regime. During the next forty years, they assured both the con-
trol of the federal government and the autonomy of political
authority in its own state. A century later, many regret the
human and natural costs of the way this leadership proceeded.
However, one is forced to acknowledge that, from their view-
point, the elite were successful in offering solutions to the two
urgent and difficult problems they faced in order to keep up
with their period’s version of globalization.
The expanding coffee plantations badly needed cheap labor
to substitute for the slaves. The São Paulo state government sub-
sidized immigration on a large scale, changing the demographic
pattern of the state and favoring branqueamento.22 In order to
keep the immigrants and to modernize the cities, sanitation pro-
grams became a priority at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury. A network of railroads and the modernization of the port
of Santos not only connected the coffee plantations to the inter-
national market but also reorganized the territory, redefined the
relationship between the city and countryside, and guaranteed
the capital of the state (the city of São Paulo) the role of centraliz-
ing pole of a productive hinterland.
Urbanization and the presence of wage laborers, however ill
paid, provided a work force and market for such industries as
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foodstuffs, textiles, sawmills, and construction. São Paulo
reached the peak of its urban growth between 1890 and 1900,
increasing 3.7 times (from 65,000 inhabitants to 240,000).23 Dur-
ing the twenties, the industrial production of the city of São
Paulo surpassed that of Rio de Janeiro, although São Paulo’s
population was still smaller.24 In São Paulo, an active labor
movement grew at the beginning of the century along with the
twin processes of urbanization and industrialization. Urban
protest and political dissatisfaction were not restricted to work-
ers. Military revolts and middle-class grievances gave a new tex-
ture to the modernist cultural production in the second decade
of the century.
At the end of the twenties, the São Paulo oligarchy that con-
trolled so completely the Brazilian political arena during the
First Republic saw the end of its hegemony. Fissures came from
other regional elite, military discontent, and middle-class critics.
A front of disparate interests supported the so-called Revolution
of 1930. The crisis that shook the world in 1929 made clear to
everyone how frail was Brazil’s position in the world system as
an exporter of coffee. President Getúlio Vargas favored central-
ization over federalism and, during the early thirties, politically
mediated several different interests, including external pres-
sures.25 After the coup d’état of 1937, the government adopted
an authoritarian profile characteristic of the epoch. A significant
group of policies regulated the labor market and industrial rela-
tions. Labor associations became subordinated to the Ministry of
Labor, Industry, and Commerce. The law fixed the minimum
wage in 1940, meaning an immediate material benefit, and the
propaganda of the regime portrayed Vargas as the “Father of
the Poor.” The corporative structure mounted at the time deeply
influenced Brazilian labor organization.
The government adopted decisive measures in order to pro-
mote the substitution of imports and the establishment of a pro-
duction-goods industry (including metallurgy, cement,
electrical, etc.). Industrialization, it seemed, would allow for the
change of course imposed by the international crisis and by the
imminence of a world conflict. Contrary to common perception,
the campaign for industrialization did not begin under the
nationalistic flag. Vargas negotiated the establishment of a steel
industry with United States Steel. The company eventually
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decided against investing, alleging the “great uncertainty of
Brazilian affairs.” The solution of state control was the result of
an agreement between the U.S. and Brazilian governments cele-
brated in 1940. Finally, credits of Export-Import Bank plus
Brazilian government resources financed the Volta Redonda
steel plant.26
The democratic interregnum between 1945 and 1964 was the
historic moment in which the debate over nationalism versus
alignment with the United States became most evident, includ-
ing a discussion within the armed forces. The nationalists
thought the Brazilian State should defend industrialization, reg-
ulating investments in strategic sectors and controlling the role
of foreign capital. Adversaries of nationalism defended less
intervention of the state in the economy, demanded rigid control
of inflation, and placed less importance on industrialization.
They allied clearly with the American crusade against commu-
nism. In his second administration (1951–54), Vargas adopted a
nationalist course in the economic area—shocking foreign com-
panies and the Brazilian elite. In addition, he announced a 100-
percent increase in the minimum wage, preventing workers’
salaries from being eroded by inflation. In 1954, in the midst of a
tempest of accusations and political crisis, he lost the support of
the armed forces. His suicide and the letter to the nation that he
left provoked an enormous popular commotion, postponing for
ten years the coup d’état of his adversaries.
Compared with the turmoil of those years, the government of
Juscelino Kubitschek (1956 – 61) looks not only stable, but opti-
mistic. A combination of public and foreign investments pushed
forward an industrialization focused on the internal market. A
new capital, Brasília, was built in the center of the country to
integrate the national economy. Modern architecture was sym-
bolically identified with modernization, and the construction of
new highways emerged as one of the most powerful elements of
a developing program. Both the construction of roads and the
urban planning emphasized the distribution of goods, and in
São Paulo, foreign companies created an automobile industry.
The national market developed quickly in those years, essen-
tially shortening geographical distances and making the land-
scapes and cultures more seemingly homogeneous.
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The political confrontation of the early sixties involved
approximately the same social agents as did the former dispute.
Here, social movements were more vocal, and for the first time
the oppressed people of the countryside demanded land reform.
In addition, the labor movement learned to rebuild parallel
organizations broader than the official syndicalism; and the sig-
nificant pull of urbanization gave more political weight to the
middle class. Students, by the sixties, became a voice on the
political scene. When the military coup arrived, the regime
attacked all the forces that supported Goulart’s populist and
nationalist government. The military rulers—although the scale
was grander and the politics authoritarian—returned to the eco-
nomic model sketched during the Kubitschek years.
While the strong presence of the state in the economy
endured (and grew significantly), foreign loans and protection
of foreign capital became constitutive aspects of the national
economy. This model privileged the big companies — foreign
and national, private and public alike. Although exports had
been encouraged, most of the industrial production was
directed to the internal market. The labor movement, the stu-
dents, and other social movements — rural and urban — were
strongly repressed by the state. Congress and other political
institutions lost their function. In sum, the high military sphere,
the intelligence agencies, and the technical bureaucracy of the
state ruled the country. On this basis, Brazil came to be the
eighth most industrialized economy in the seventies.
The effort of controlling and integrating a huge territory
included policies for the modernization of telecommunications
and electronic media. The cultural and economic impact of these
means contributed to the completion of the formation of a
national market. Here, their political importance must also be
emphasized in a country where the construction of a basic edu-
cational system has been always overlooked. The national mar-
ket, which attained a considerable size, never truly became a
mass market because the purchasing power of the minimum
wage fell dramatically. A significant part of the Brazilian popu-
lation was “integrated” into this market only by a “desire” to
consume, having access to but a few commodities from the
astonishing diversity advertised. While geographical distances
shrunk and landscapes and cultures turned out to become even
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more homogeneous than before, the untouched demons of
social exclusion, disregard for human and natural life, and
acceptance of violence as normal had grown frighteningly dur-
ing the decades of the dictatorship.
The profound international productive rearrangement, which
some have called the Third Industrial Revolution, or Technolog-
ical Revolution, was already felt in Brazil during the seventies.
The diffusion of the new technologies associated with new
forms of management took place during the crisis of the military
regime model of industrial relations. The economic crisis,
democratization, and the emergence of a “new” labor move-
ment brought these questions to the forefront. The process had a
tentative character in a moment of retraction of the national
market and reordering of international markets.27 Diversification
and smaller scales of production, exploring specific market
niches, and quality instead of quantity — are the new slogans
adopted worldwide. An important consequence of this
rearrangement is the intensive use of skilled, flexible, coopera-
tive labor instead of the extensive abuse of unskilled, limited,
replaceable labor. The Brazilian elite’s traditional neglect of edu-
cation became a serious economic obstacle at this point.
While throughout the world old productive structures are
rapidly abandoned and the scientific ability to create new tech-
nologies and new products become fundamental, the modern-
ization of industry in Brazil continues in a context of crisis and
unemployment that accentuates the authoritarian bias of the
culture and makes difficult the introduction of more democratic
and participatory management systems of industrial relations.
Although the educational system did expand during the past
few decades, it currently faces the urgent challenge of attaining
both quantity and quality. A comparison with the last broad
rearrangement of the world economy a century ago is sugges-
tive. Again, the country has to deal with the labor problem, the
constructive effort involved in the production of a territory
organized in accordance with the economic, social, and cultural
standards of our time. Once more, requalifying the relationship
between the city and the countryside, the productive spaces
within both, and Brazil’s role in the international division of
labor is not a question of physical investment, but one of the
construction of institutions capable of dealing with changing
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social relations. Of course, international subordination persists,
but under new terms. In the late eighties, the fall of the so-called
real socialism brought the Cold War world to an end. Neoliberal
ideology has restored the old idea that the invisible hand of the
market, with minimal state intervention, is the appropriate strat-
egy to deal with economic and even social problems.
Brazil faces these challenges from a difficult position. Eco-
nomic growth brought about devastating social effects. In the
scenery of the huge, disorganized cities, pollution, noise and
congestion, crime, and abandoned children are exposed crudely.
Retirees line up for hours in order to receive a meager monthly
retirement of U.S.$110 or less. A state that never took up its
social assignments, including the guaranteeing of the basic
rights of citizenship, is now under the threat of breaking down.
For, in these circumstances, it is easier to rhetorically recom-
mend a decrease of public policies.
A redefinition of the state’s role in the economy as well as in
the society is on not only the Brazilian agenda, but also the
world’s. Apparently, humanity learned very well how to pro-
duce. Now the time has come to think about ways to distribute.
For Brazil, leader in income concentration and social inequality,
it is imperative to deal with this problem.
Social fragmentation, new forms of exclusion, diaspora,
destruction — what is specific in the globalization process as
seen from the South Atlantic? The anthropologist Lévi-Strauss
once said that our cities became ruins before they were built. For
many centuries, people in Brazil have lived the sensation of pre-
cariousness and instability said to be characteristic of post-
modernity. In Brazil, as well as in the other Latin American
countries, time has produced mostly ruins in a space without
memories. In the midst of the endless contradictions in which
human interchange has occurred, was there also a process of
construction of a world culture?
III. Between National Unity and Sociocultural Differences
In 1822, with the political independence of Brazil, nationality
and nationhood became important references in the elite’s social
thought. Political and juridical discourses—beginning with that
pronounced by the imperial bureaucracy — forged the myth of
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national unity based on an imagined community of language,
territory, and religion. Literature performed an important role
in this identity-building process.28 Indianism,29 in the context of
the Romantic Movement, offered the legitimacy of a mythical
and genuine origin. This myth obscured the persistence of Black
slavery and the actual exclusion of the native from the process of
constructing Brazilian citizenship. This was the reason why the
Romantic authentication of Brazil’s past matched so well with
the centralization of the state and with the repression of social
and federalist movements in the provinces.
The Catholic Church, organically tied to the state during the
Empire, contributed to the unification of “national spirit” by the
“formation of the souls.” At the end of the nineteenth century,
however, certain scientific doctrines, such as evolutionism, natu-
ralism, and racial theories, played a decisive role in the design of
“Brazilian identity.” With the abolition of slavery in 1888 and
the declaration of the Republic in 1889, the positivist ideology
gained enormous influence in social and political thought.
Authors like Graça Aranha and Euclydes da Cunha, who in 1902
published formative books about the impasses of modern
Brazil,30 inquired about less traumatic ways to integrate the
Brazilian backwoods into the civilizing process radiating from
the cities and shaped by European values. It seems that in Brazil
as well as Europe, three “cultures,” or discursive fields, com-
peted in the search for the explicative keys to the “unifying
interpretation” of the country: the literary field, the scientific-
naturalist field, and the sociological field.31
At the beginning of the twentieth century, several projects
and conceptions about modernization competed in the political
and cultural spheres of Brazilian society over the best way to
insert the country into the world of modern nations. With the
incremental growth of urbanization and industrialization, a sig-
nificant labor movement developed. Directed by socialists, anar-
cho-communists, and, above all, anarcho-syndicalists, this labor
movement believed that reform, or an anticapitalist social revo-
lution, would be the best strategy—always in an internationalist
perspective—for creating a “modern civilization” in Brazil. The
truth is that, in general, from revolutionaries to conservative
nationalists, most of the authors adhered to the ideology of
progress.
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Exceptions to this standard — such as the historians Capis-
trano de Abreu and Manoel Bonfim, poets Cruz e Souza and
Augusto dos Anjos, and writers Gonzaga Duque and Lima Bar-
reto—stand out from their contemporaries exactly because they
raised serious doubts about a “national identity” singularly
based on the idea of progress at any price, and according to
European or North American models. For instance, the North-
eastern poet Augusto dos Anjos32 says in his poem “Os doentes”
(The Sick Men) of 1912:
E o índio, por fim, adstrito à étnica escória,
Recebeu, tendo o horror no rosto impresso,
Esse achincalhamento do progresso
Que o anulava na crítica da História!33
New attempts at “rediscovering Brazil” arose with the São
Paulo Modernism of 1922 and the rise to power of a nationalist-
positivist military, bureaucratic, and intellectual group led by
Vargas in the so-called Revolution of 1930. The intellectual gen-
eration of elites, including Paulo Prado, Gilberto Freyre,
Oliveira Vianna, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, Caio Prado Jr.,
and Fernando de Azevedo, among others, searched using differ-
ent theoretical and idelogical frameworks, although with a simi-
lar question in mind: the roots of a possible “Brazilian culture.”
Elaborating a diagnosis of the causes of our historic failures,
they each identified the virtual agents of change as well as the
potential conditions for modernization. Sometimes they favored
the role of a centralized national state, sometimes the role of cor-
porate organizations. They mentioned either the role of adapta-
tive plasticity of the culture or the role of revolutionary parties
and movements. Some of them proposed a relative national iso-
lation while others proposed a complete integration into the
world capitalist system.
A paradox remains in this strong essayist and interpretative
tradition that continues today: the successive identifications that
art, thought, and political practices have projected toward
“national identity” come in turn to obscure the real weight of
historic, regional, and cultural differences in Brazilian life.
Ignoring or absorbing the social alterities in the identitarian
game, these discourses, even the most libertarian, commit the
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same violence—identity, a trace of blood, silence, and exclusion
persists. This signals—even in the garrets of memory—the des-
tiny of the “wretched of the earth” to exile in their own land; to
the end of their languages, beliefs, and hopes; or simply to phys-
ical elimination.34
Given the chance, can Brazilians gather scattered resources,
knowledge, and will to make an inclusive community marked
by autonomy and pluralism? The major challenge of the next
century (and the millennium as well) will be to invent in the
daily practice of our societies new forms of economic distribu-
tion, technological management, and political representation,
not only in Brazil but in all the countries that constitute this
“globalized” humanity.
IV. The Promised Land
At the time of this writing, a photographic essay about the Sem
Terra Movement (MST) by Sebastião Salgado is being dissemi-
nated in Brazil and ninety other countries.35 It contains a presen-
tation by the Portuguese writer José Saramago and a compact
disc with songs composed by Chico Buarque and Milton Nasci-
mento. In these same days of April 1997, nearly 60,000 landless
workers arrived in Brasília. They marched in concentric circles
from several regions of the country, crossing thousands of kilo-
meters toward the federal capital. They aimed to call the atten-
tion of the central authorities, including the president, to the
unresolved situation of agrarian crises and conflicts in the
Brazilian countryside. One of the songs written by Chico Buar-
que, named “Assentamento” (Settlement), which comes with
the photographic album referred to above, says the following:
Zanza pra aqui
Zanza pra acolá
Fim de feira, periferia afora
A cidade não mora mais em mim
Francisco, Serafim
Vamos embora
( . . . )
Quando eu morrer
Cansado de guerra
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Morro de bem
Com a minha terra:
Cana, caqui
Inhame, abóbora
Onde só vento se semeava
outrora
Amplidão, nação, sertão sem fim
Oh Manuel, Miguilim
Vamos embora36
In the “Age of Globalization,” the active presence of these
“wretched of the earth” wandering in an endless displacement
found a faithful portrait in Buarque’s composition. Their
nomadic destiny and suffering is touchingly captured by the
photographer-artist. Here is a vivid and concentrated tale about
exclusion and citizenship, and the abuse of human beings and
the environment. Such distinctive forms of resistance and politi-
cal practices show how relative is the idea of homogeneity
formed by inheritance from the modern civilization of the West.
Perhaps one should clarify that in Portuguese assentamento
(settlement) means a portion of land taken by the government
from expropriated unproductive large estates or from public
land and distributed to the dispossessed workers. However, it
also means attachment to the soil and stable occupation of the
land through agriculture or cattle. Culturally, it can mean the
search for or discovery of roots, the design of an identity based
on a concrete and collective historic-geographic experience.
Sebastião Salgado’s photographs and Chico Buarque’s poetry
and music talk about the same excluding forces of the globaliz-
ing process promoted by technological-industrial modernity.
We recognize the remote descendants of the native population
in the agonizing and leathery faces portrayed by Salgado. Most
of them are nomadic; they draw trails and itineraries in their
long marches by sertões37 and forests, creating a truly “savage
cartography” in the constitution of the future Brazilian terri-
tory.38 We recognize also the centuries-long diaspora of the
African slaves and their Afro-Brazilian heirs. They learned early
to survive the sharp tearing of roots and to resist in the quilombos
(common territories that served as hiding places against slav-
ery).
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In those images, sounds, and words we can also see the Italian
rural poor who immigrated en masse during the peak of the cof-
fee economy. We may even find the European immigrants who
cultivated small land properties in the South, later pushed out
by the new land concentration process linked to the advance of
urban-industrial capitalism. They are all characters depicted in
the Brazilian literature, from José de Alencar and Euclydes da
Cunha to Graciliano Ramos and Guimarães Rosa.
Viewed from other Latin American countries — or from the
vantage point of any other country that had known the violence
of the modern colonial process in the Americas, Africa, Asia,
and Oceania — the situation would not be so different. The so-
called global age accelerated in this postcolonial world the shock
of encounters with others more powerful. In these circum-
stances, these questions arise: How does one forge a unified
world around the values of democracy, peace, and human rights
that does not mutilate whole cultures or expel entire popula-
tions from their locales? How is it possible to make technologi-
cal and industrial development effectively human and social?
How can humanity continue to live and to grow without threat-
ening the very survival of life on the planet?
These challenges — despite the declarations of states, politi-
cians, and bureaucrats — remain highly problematic, con-
tentious, and open questions. Brazil, for its significant
dimension,39 no doubt has an important role to play. To begin
the task, perhaps it is necessary to invert the terms of the
dilemma as normally presented by the media and government
authorities. Instead of the usual neoliberal slogan “globalize or
perish,” we should ask seriously and urgently what should be
done so as not to perish globally. Brazil, champion of inequality,
knows how to produce and reproduce exclusion and death in a
centennial routine. Paradoxically, with its hybrid culture and
amazing diversity of formative experiences, Brazil could find
less dogmatic and more complex answers as a contribution to a
postcolonial and global world.
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